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Abstract: 
 
This paper estimates the impact of regional linkages (i.e. regional trading agreements) 
and historical linkages (i.e. neo-colonial trade ties) on trade pattern in the Western 
Hemisphere using the gravity model of international trade.  The estimation is made at the 
aggregate trade level as well as on the disaggregated level by using trade data 
corresponding to food products and manufactured goods respectively.  The evidence 
suggests that significant distortions of trade patterns due to regional and historical 
linkages exist. It seems that smaller economies are more receptive to the effects of 
regionalism than larger ones and that the food sector is more affected by distortions than 
the manufactured goods sector. 
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1.  Introduction and Background 
 
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is currently being negotiated 
among 34 countries in North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean.
1  The goal is a 
free trade area spanning the entire Western Hemisphere.  While the negotiations are 
scheduled to be complete by the end of 2005, the FTAA’s implementation continues to 
be a sensitive issue.  As such, it is important that the discussion is based on empirical 
facts and not political propaganda.  Obviously, the issues surrounding the FTAA are too 
vast and too complex to be addressed in any single work.  However, a good starting point 
for analyzing the FTAA is to develop a clear understanding of the underlying pattern of 
trade in the Western Hemisphere.   
It can be postulated that the trade patterns in the Western Hemisphere are 
influenced by trade relationships resulting from different types of linkages.  For instance, 
there are often strong trade relationships between countries on a regional basis.  There are 
currently seven major regional trading agreements in the Western Hemisphere.  They are 
presented with their respective members and years of enactment in Table 1.  As the table 
suggests, almost every economy in the hemisphere is participating in a regional trading 
agreement of some sort.  As these agreements essentially follow geographical regions, 
they divide the hemisphere into different sub-regions.  An economic integration scheme 
can be considered a regional linkage affecting trade patterns.  
Other linkages are the consequence of historical legacies.  Most FTAA economies 
are former European colonies. As pointed out by Grier, establishing trade linkages was 
often one of the major motivations behind imperialism.  As a lingering effect, there are   4
often neo-colonial trade ties present with large volumes of trade between the former 
colony and the former metropolitan ruler in Western Europe.   
Trade data reveal some support for the above hypothesized trade relationships.  
Table 2 presents the intra-regional trade shares for the regional groupings in Table 1 over 
the past decade.
2  The intra-regional trade shares in the table are defined as the percentage 
of total merchandise exports of a particular grouping that is destined for other member 
countries.  The Caribbean Community (Caricom), Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur), 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have experienced an increase 
in intra-regional trade over the past decade.  Intra-regional trade among the Andean 
Group increased initially during the nineties, but seems to have reach its peak of almost 
13 percent in 1998 with a sharp decrease in subsequent years.  The Central American 
Common Market (Cacm) exhibits a similar trend, but the peak was reached earlier 
followed by a sharper decrease.
3   
Similarly, a useful way of detecting neo-colonial trade ties is to observe the 
percentage of a former colony’s total exports destined for the former colonial ruler.  
Using export data from the United Nations COMSTAT Database, this trade share for the 
Caribbean economies, most of which are former British dependencies, ranges between 8 
to 15 percent of total exports over the past decades.  Interestingly, no analogous 
relationship exists for most former Spanish and Portuguese dependencies as the 
corresponding export-shares linger in the lower single.
4   
While particular trade relationships exist, they may simply be part of the ‘natural’ 
trade pattern that would prevail if regional and historical linkages had no significant 
impact on trade behavior.  That is, they would naturally result due to the economic and   5
geographic circumstance of trading partners, i.e. countries within a particular region may 
exhibit higher trade level internally vis-à-vis other trading partners due to cultural 
similarities within a region and geographic proximity, and the presumed neo-colonial 
trade bias might just be in response to the relative market size of Western Europe.  
Hence, these trade relationships may not represent any true distortions of trade patterns.  
Given this context, it becomes interesting to address the extent to which these linkages 
truly influence trade behavior.   
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the determinants of trade 
patterns in the Western Hemisphere using the gravity model of international trade.  In 
particular, this paper focuses on the extent to which regional linkages, i.e. regional 
trading agreements, and historical linkages, i.e. colonial legacies, influence trade 
behavior after the gravity model accounts for the hemisphere’s ‘natural’ trade pattern.  
The model is applied to a data set encompassing the nine-year period 1992-2000.  To 
capture any sectoral differences, the estimation is implemented using both aggregated and 
disaggregated trade data.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section two presents a brief 
review of the literature.  Section three follows with an introduction to the gravity model.  
The next section addresses the empirical specification and discusses the data.  Section 
five presents the empirical results.  The final section concludes.   
 
2.  Brief Literature Review 
There is a plethora of works analyzing integration in the Western Hemisphere 
with widely varying conclusions and hypotheses (i.e. Bouzas; Lee; Nicholls et al.;   6
Panagariya; Salazar-Xirinachs and Tavares de Araujo Jr; Smith).  Thorough 
investigations of trade patterns are less plentiful.  Much recent work on the economic 
impact associated with trade liberalization and economic integration in the hemisphere 
have been based on Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models (i.e. Diao and 
Somwaru; Rutherford and Martinez).  However, CGE models generally result in the 
smaller economies in the Caribbean basin and Central America to be subsumed into 
regional aggregates such a ‘Central America and the Caribbean’ or ‘Latin America and 
the Caribbean’.  As such, much information about the individual economies is lost.  
Consequently, the usefulness of such models in analyzing the impact of Western 
Hemispheric integration may be limited due to the inherent diversity of the FTAA 
economies, both in terms of economics and in terms of sheer physical size.     
An alternative framework for analyzing trade patterns is the use of gravity 
models.  The gravity methodology provides an intuitive and convenient framework for 
analyzing trade flows.  Gravity models also have the ability to incorporate the 
characteristics of each country as an individual unit regardless of its size.  The 
methodology has been widely used in the investigation of trade patterns in varying 
contexts over the past four decades.  Some have applied the model to assess the influence 
of regionalism, as well as other factors, in the Western Hemisphere (i.e. Egoume-
Bossogo and Mendis; Endoh; Frankel, Stein, and Wei 1995, 1997; Garman, Peterson and 
Gilliard; Sandberg, Taylor, and Seale; Soloaga and Winters; Thoumi 1989a, b).  They all 
find differing degrees of significant regional influences on trade patterns.  However, the 
literature commonly fails to include the majority of the hemisphere’s economies or to 
extend the analysis to the overall pattern of trade.  Furthermore, Rauch and Sandberg,   7
Taylor, and Seale detect significant colonial linkages using the gravity model, however, 
the former employed a more general worldwide model and the latter focused exclusively 
on the Caribbean.   
 
3.  The Gravity Model 
The basic idea behind the gravity model is that bilateral trade from one country to 
another can be explained by factors that capture the potential of a country to export goods 
and services, factors that capture the propensity of a country to import goods and 
services, and any other forces that either attract or inhibit bilateral trade.  Sandberg 
provides a thorough review of the model’s evolution and alternate uses over time.  
  The origin of gravity model analysis in international trade is generally attributed 
to Tinbergen and Pöyhönen (1963a,b) who independently and concurrently explored 
similar models.  While there are several variations on the theme, a typical gravity model 
of international trade takes the following form 
(1) 
03 5 12 4 ijt u
ijt it it jt jt ij X eYNY N De e
ββ β ββ β =
Wγ , 
where Xijt is the bilateral exports from country i to country j in period t; Yit, Yjt are the 
GDPs of countries i and j in time t, respectively; Nit, Njt are the trading partners’ 
respective populations in time t; Dij is the bilateral distance between the two countries; 
and the model is commonly augmented with W, a vector of variables capturing any 
resistance or enhancement factors to trade.
5  Following convention, u is a normally 
distributed error component capturing any random influences.  
  The income, population, and distance variables represent the so-called the ‘gravity 
variables.’  These variables establish what can be thought of as a ‘normal’ pattern of trade   8
prevailing given the economic and geographic characteristics of trading partners in the 
absence of any systematic distortions.  An appealing feature of the model is its ability to 
identify any systematic distortions or deviations vis-à-vis these presumably ‘normal’ 
trade flows.  This is commonly accomplished by including binary variables in W.
6  Using 
binary variables to capture the effects of qualitative factors enables one to assess by what 
factor trade flows under such influence differ from the undistorted trade pattern.   
As an illustration, assume that a regional trading agreement is postulated to affect 
trade patterns.  Let a binary variable be introduced controlling for participation in this 
agreement.  When both country i and country j participate in the particular agreement, the 
variable is assigned a value of 1, 0 otherwise.  Thus, the distortion due to the regional 
trading agreement, or the deviation from the ‘normal’ trade pattern, would be a factor 
equal to the exponential of the estimated coefficient of this variable times the 
‘undistorted’ trade.  The case where the binary variable is zero would thus represent the 
‘undistorted’ trade pattern.
7   
 
4.  Econometric Specification and Data 
  The gravity model used in this paper is a slightly modified version of the model 
presented above.  The GDP terms in (1) are interchanged for their respective GDP per 
capita as to better capture the trading capacity of the particular countries.
8  The use of per 
capita income rather than absolute income also alleviates the inherent problem of 
comparing economies of widely varying sizes.  For the purposes of this study, the effects 
of historical and regional linkages will be introduced by the inclusion of binary variables 
in W.  After taking the natural logarithm the econometric model becomes   9
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ijt = (Xijt + 1) and Xijt is the nominal dollar value of exports from country i to 
 country  j in time t (this procedure eliminates the problem of ‘zero observations’, 
  i.e. the instances where bilateral exports are zero);  
Yt is the nominal dollar value of a particular country’s GDP in time t;  
Nt is the population of a particular country in time t;  
Dij is the bilateral distance in kilometers between the capitals of country i and 
 country  j;  
Remotenesst is the ‘relative distance’ of a particular country to its trading partners 
  as measured by the average distance to its trading partners in the sample as 
  weighted by their respective share in world GDP in time t;  
Borderij is a binary variable measuring the effect of adjacency, defined to equal 1 
 if  country  i and country j share a common border, 0 otherwise;  
Languageij is binary variable measuring the cultural effect of sharing a common 
  language, defined to equal 1 if both trading partners share a common commercial 
  language, 0 otherwise;    10
UK Colony is a binary variable capturing any British neo-colonial ties, defined to 
  equal 1 if one of the trading partners is the UK and the other a former British 
  dependency in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise;
9 
Spain Colony is a binary variable capturing any Spanish neo-colonial ties, defined 
to equal 1 if one of the trading partners is Spain and the other a former Spanish 
dependency in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise; 
Portugal Colony is a binary variable capturing any Portuguese neo-colonial ties, 
defined to equal 1 if one of the trading partners is Portugal and the other a former 
Portuguese dependency in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise; 
NAFTA, Caricom, Mercosur, Andean Pact, and Cacm are binary variables 
capturing the effects of any linkages resulting from participating in a particular 
regional trading agreement (i.e. NAFTA, Caricom, Mercosur, Andean Pact, and 
Cacm respetively), defined to equal 1 if both country i and country j are both 
members of a particular grouping, 0 otherwise;
10  
EU Importer is a binary variable measuring the effect of the often generous 
preferential treatment given by the EU, defined to equal 1 if the importing country 
(i.e. country j) is the a member of the EU, 0 otherwise.   
The above model is fitted to trade data obtained from the Inter-American 
Development Bank’s DATA Intal CD-rom.  The data consists of annual observations 
over the time period 1992 through 2000.  GDP and population data are obtained from the 
United Nations COMSTAT database.  The distance data, language, border, and colonial 
information are obtained from Gaulier, Mayer and Zignago.  Information regarding   11
participation in regional trading agreements is obtained from Frankel, Stein, and Wei 
(1997).   
  There are a total of 64 countries in the sample.  In addition to the FTAA 
economies, the majority of the OCED countries, India, Indonesia, Israel, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and South Africa are included in the sample.
11  Each bilateral export flow in a 
given year represents one observation.  The data set used in this paper is somewhat 
unique vis-à-vis other gravity model applications in that the data set is hemispheric 
centered.  What that implies is that in each observation, at least one of the trading 
partners, i.e. either the exporting country, the importing country or both, are located in 
the Western Hemisphere.  Thus, the data set encompasses the bilateral trade among the 
FTAA countries and the bilateral trade between the FTAA countries and their ‘external’ 
trading partners, but not the bilateral trade between the ‘external’ non-FTAA economies.  
As a consequence, the results in this paper are directly applicable to the trade pattern of 
the Western Hemisphere, whereas most other gravity estimations result in a world-model 
of trade   
 
5.  Empirical Results and Discussion 
  There is no reason to believe that trade patterns are the same across all sectors of 
an economy (i.e. the impact of regionalism on agricultural trade may very well differ 
from the impact on manufactured goods trade).  As such, the model will be estimated 
using three different trade data sets.  First, the model is estimated using aggregated trade 
data.  Second, the model is re-estimated using disaggregated trade data.  The dataset in 
disaggregated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)   12
system.  Two particular desegregations are of interest, the trade in ‘all food products’ 
(UNCTAD category 1) and the trade in ‘manufactured goods’ (UNCTAD category 5).  
The model is estimated for each of the nine years (1992-2000) for each data set.  Due to 
data availability the number of observations in each year for each data set varies.  The 
estimation is accomplished by using GAUSS programming language.  The estimated 
parameters are presented in Table 3 (aggregated trade), Table 4 (UNCTAD category 1) 
and Table 5 (UNCTAD category 5).  To avoid the inherent problem of heteroskedasticity 
in cross-sectional data sets encompassing units of vastly varying sizes, the estimated 
standard errors are White’s robust standard errors.  The reader should note that parameter 
estimates for the UK colonial and Caricom variables are unavailable for 1992 and 1993 
due to missing observations and the NAFTA variable is unavailable since the NAFTA 
agreement was not effective until 1994.  These three variables had to be dropped from the 
two years to avoid perfect collinearity.   
According to the r-squares and the overall F-tests, the model fits the data sets well 
and exhibits statistically significant explanatory power.  As expected, the basic gravity 
variables perform well empirically.  The magnitude of the parameter estimates is higher 
for aggregated trade than when the data is disaggregated.  Rather consistently, the effect 
of the exporter’s variables outweigh the effect of the importer’s, although the difference 
is lessened once the data is disaggregated.  For trade in food products, the difference is 
only marginal.  It seems that the trade patterns in the Western Hemisphere are relatively 
more determined by exporting country’s trading capacity than the trading capacity of the 
importer.  As an interesting note, the estimated distance parameter for the aggregated data 
set is close to negative 2, thus resembling Newton’s original gravitational formula.     13
  The remoteness of the exporter exerts a positive influence on manufactures trade, 
but a negative effect on food products.  When relatively remotely located, a country will 
engage in more merchandise trade with partners within a particular distance to a greater 
extent than otherwise.  For food products, however, the trade increasing effect seems to 
be outweighed by the higher transportation cost required for goods to reach the importer 
as food products tend to be bulky relative to their value.  As a consequence of these 
opposite effects, the impact on aggregate trade is ambiguous.  The remoteness of the 
importing country seem not to matter significantly for manufactured goods trade, whereas 
the impact on food products and aggregated trade is positive.  A relatively remote country 
tends to import more food products from a particular trading partner and potential 
exporters seemingly search for the closest importer.  In general, the parameter estimates 
stand in sharp contrast with the results of Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1997).   
  For all three data sets, statistically significant neo-colonial linkages are detected.  
The results suggest that the UK and Spain in particular exert a strong influence on the 
trade behavior of their former dependencies.  Obviously, this is due to a combination of 
preferential treatment and historical ties.  The effect of the British linkage is greater in 
magnitude for food products than for manufactures.  Manufactured goods trade 
seemingly follows a normal pattern to a greater extent than trade in food products, 
although a neo-colonial distortion is still present.  The neo-colonial bias for food products 
can thus be thought of as being induced through overly generous preferences.  The 
upward neo-colonial distortion for food products is roughly 12 (the exponential of 2.5) 
times what trade would be been in the absence of this linkage.  The corresponding figure 
for manufactured goods is roughly 2.7 (the exponential of unity) times the undistorted   14
trade in the absence of the neo-colonial linkage.  This magnitude is slightly larger for 
aggregated trade indicating that even stronger neo-colonial distortions are present in other 
UNCTAD product groups, such as raw materials, ores and metals, or fuels.  The 
parameter estimates for aggregate trade are similar to Sandberg, Taylor, and Seale who 
also look at British linkages.   
The Spanish neo-colonial distortion follow a similar trend, however, the 
magnitude of the distortion is significantly smaller than the British (ranging from roughly 
1.5 to 2.2 times the undistorted trade).  In contrast, it does not seem to be the case that 
other product groups are subject to graver distortions, as the aggregate parameters fall in 
between those for UNCTAD category 1 and UNCTAD category 5.  In general, the results 
for the colonial linkage between Brazil and Portugal are ambiguous.   
  For the British case, the existence of a significant colonial linkage confirms what 
can be suspected from looking at trade data.  In the Spanish case, however, the existence 
of a distortion reinforces the strength of the gravity model.  Even though the causal 
observation of trade data does not reveal a clear distortion (neo-colonial trade shares in 
the lower single digits), there is indeed a statistically significant linkage present after 
controlling for the natural trade patterns resulting from economics and geography.  The 
influence that Portugal may exert might already be captured by the EU importer and 
Language variables.  It seems that preferential treatment from the EU has exerted an 
upward bias on food trade in particular, but in terms of manufactured goods (a negative 
effect) the natural trade pattern suggest that the Western Hemisphere would trade more 
with EU than they actually do.  This notion is reinforced by the ambiguous result when 
the model is fitted to aggregated trade data.     15
  Regional linkages are also significant in determining hemispheric trade patterns.  
The estimated parameters for the NAFTA linkage are at first puzzling with the estimates 
being negative and significant for aggregate trade but insignificant for food and 
manufactured goods trade.  Do the estimated parameters indicate that NAFTA has been a 
failure as a regional grouping?  Not at all.  Given the economic characteristics and the 
geography of the NAFTA countries vis-à-vis the other countries in the hemisphere, the 
gravity model predicts that they would trade rather extensively with each other.  
Following such reasoning, it can be concluded that the trade in food and manufacturers 
among the NAFTA countries largely follow the undistorted trade pattern and the 
influence of trade in other UNCTAD categories, i.e. raw materials, ores and metals, and 
fuels carry over into the aggregate estimates.  Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995, 1997) also 
find ambiguous results regarding the NAFTA parameter.  
  An interesting story unfolds when looking at the parameter estimates for the 
Caricom, Andean Pact, and Cacm variables.  These regional groupings have exerted a 
strong positive effect on trade patterns.  The estimated parameters are comparable to 
those of Sandberg, Taylor, and Seale, Egoume-Bossogo and Mendis, and Soloaga and 
Winters, but the Andean Pact parameters stand in contrast with Frankel, Stein, and Wei 
(1995, 1997) and Garman, Petersen, and Gilliard.  The linkage among the Caricom and 
Cacm countries outweighs that of the Andean Pact regardless of data set.  It is intriguing 
that both the Caricom and the Cacm consists of smaller economies and are located in 
Central American and the Caribbean Basin.  Thus, it seems that smaller economies are 
more receptive to the changes in trade patterns resulting from regionalism.     16
The effect of the Caricom is strongest for aggregated trade and weakest for 
manufactured goods trade.  The Central American Common Market and the Andean Pact 
regional linkages exert most influence over trade in food products and the least over 
manufactured goods trade.  Similar to the neo-colonial distortions, the manufacturing 
sector seems less affected by linkages.  Yet, the distortions of manufactured goods trade 
are still large, roughly a factor of 20 times the undistorted trade in the absence of 
regionalism for Caricom, 11 times the undistorted trade for Cacm, and a factor of double 
the undistorted trade for the Andean Pact.  In the Caricom case, the influence of other 
UNCTAD product groups may contribute to the larger effect for aggregated trade.  
Intriguingly, most the Caricom economies are former British colonies and the influence 
of other UNCTAD product groups was also postulated to be large for the colonial 
distortion.   There may be a relation between these findings.  Finally, Mercosur only 
distorts food trade, whereas manufactured goods trade seem to follow an undistorted 
pattern.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper finds that both regional and historical linkages significantly influence 
the trade pattern of the economies in the Western Hemisphere.  The evidence suggests 
that the trade pattern of the smaller economies in the hemisphere is distorted to a greater 
extent by these linkages than the trade pattern of their larger counterparts.  These effects 
are often quite large.  In particular, regional linkages are significant among the countries 
in the Caribbean Community, the Central American Common Market, and to a somewhat 
lesser extent also the countries of the Andean Pact.  NAFTA and Mercosur, on the other   17
hand, do not seem to alter trade patterns to the same extent after controlling for the 
economic and geographic characteristics of trading partners.   
The key becomes to enact policies aiming at engaging the already strongly 
integrated groupings in the central region of the hemisphere, i.e. Caricom and Cacm, with 
the northern and southern groupings, i.e. NAFTA and Mercosur.  Similarly, it is 
important to link those economies with each other, forming a North-South nexus, 
especially as NAFTA and Mercosur represent potential opposite forces during the 
implementation.   
Furthermore, the results indicate that Britain and Spain do exert a neo-colonial 
influence distorting the trade pattern of their former dependencies.  Since these linkages 
affect trade patterns, they need to be taken into account when analyzing the FTAA as 
they may interfere with the integration process.  There is also evidence that the trade of 
the former British colonies in the Caribbean Basin in product groups other than food 
products and manufactures are even more receptive to the effects of these linkages.  
Overall, it seems that trade in food products is more receptive to distortions from regional 
and historical linkages than trade in manufactured goods.   
Being that the results different depending on product group, it raises an interesting 
empirical issue.  Unless it can be statistically shown that the data set can be pooled across 
categories, estimation should be made at a disaggregated level whenever data availability 
allows, as conclusions would differ based on what sector is being studied.  Thus, it adds a 
dimension to the issue of pooling the data for panel estimation.  Not only must one 
consider whether or not the data can be pooled over cross-sectional units (i.e. country 
pairs) and time periods (i.e. years), but one must also consider if pooling across product   18
groups is appropriate.  Perhaps the gravity model should not be pooled across products 
categories.  The appropriate estimation of this model as a panel definitely represents a 
fruitful extension for future research.  
   19
                                                 
1 These countries include Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St Kitts and 
Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela (Free Trade Area of the Americas Administrative Secretariat).  Note that Antigua and Cuba 
are not part of the list.   
 
2 Note that the data refers to merchandise trade only. 
 
3 As a comparison, intra-regional trade in the European Union (EU) has been remarkably stable over the 
past decade.   
 
4 Grier suggests that Britain has maintained a closer relationship with its former dependencies after 
independence than for example Spain and France.  These closer relationships would results in stronger 
trade ties, i.e. higher trade levels, between Britain and its former colonies after their independence.   
 
5 For simplicity, it is assumed here that these variables enter the model exponentially 
 
6 In previous research, such variables have included different measures of the price level in each country, 
the exchange rate, trade policy proxies, binary variables for assessing the impact of qualitative factors such 
as participation in regional trading agreements, of sharing a common commercial language (the sharing a 
common language is often used as a proxy for cultural similarities), of sharing a common border, and of 
historical colonial ties.   
 
7 This would follow since the binary variables in this case enter the model as a factor of unity (the 
exponential of zero is equal to one).   
 
8 Due to the multiplicative specification of the model, interchanging absolute GDP for per capita GDP does 
not alter the model significantly.  The original model can still be recovered by manipulation of the 
parameters.   
 
9 The United States is not counted as a former British colony for the purposes of this paper.   
 
10 Since the purposes of this paper is to capture the effects of regional linkages, The Group of Three and 
LAFTA are not accounted for here due to their pan-regional nature and overlapping memberships.   
 
11 The countries included in the sample are Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, South 
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  REFERENCES 
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Table 1: Current Regional Agreements in the Western Hemisphere 





Table 2: Intra-Regional Export Shares (as % of Total Merchandise Exports) 
  1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
           
Andean  Group  3.8  9.8 10.5 12  9.7 10.8  12.8 8.8  8.4 
CACM  15.3 16.9 16.7 21.7  22  18.1 16.1 12.8 13.7 
CARICOM  8.1  8.8  8.7  12.1  13  14.4 17.3 16.9 14.6 
MERCOSUR  8.9  18.5 19.2 20.2 22.8 24.8  25  20.6 20.9 
NAFTA  41.4 45.8 47.9 46.2 47.5 49.1 51.7 54.6 55.7 
For comparison purposes:          
European  Union  65.9 61.7 62.1 62.4 61.5 55.5  57  63.3 62.1 
Source: World Bank (various years).  Data refers to merchandise trade only. 
CACM:  Central American Common Market, CARICOM:  Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(also referred to as Caribbean Community), MERCOSUR:  Mercado Comun del Sur, NAFTA:  North 
American Free Trade Agreement.  Please refer to Table 1 for membership information.   
 
 
Name of Agreement  Year 
Enacted 
Current Members 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement  
1994  Canada, Mexico, the United States 
Latin American Free Trade 
Association/Latin American 
Integration Association 
1960/1980  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Mercado Comun del Sur  1991  Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
Andean Community  1969  Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela 
Caribbean Community and 
Common Market 
1973  Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago 
Central American Common 
Market 
1959  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua 
Group of Three  1995  Columbia, Mexico, and Venezuela Table 3:  Aggregate Trade  
Dependent Variable: ln(exports from country i to country j in U.S. dollars in a given year) 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Period 
Average 
            
Constant  -55.099*** -46.949*** -56.838*** -58.040*** -58.914*** -60.092*** -57.846*** -53.689*** -59.040*** -56.278 
  (6.251) (6.335) (4.487) (5.057) (5.081) (4.665) (4.359) (4.730) (4.246)   
GDP  per  capita  Exporter  2.241*** 2.167*** 1.975*** 2.038*** 1.987*** 1.999*** 1.873*** 1.840*** 1.846***  1.996 
  (0.088) (0.085) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.060)   
GDP  per  capita  Importer  1.309*** 1.243*** 1.203*** 1.136*** 1.133*** 1.191*** 1.269*** 1.103*** 1.109***  1.188 
  (0.099) (0.095) (0.068) (0.074) (0.072) (0.067) (0.069) (0.068) (0.066)   
Population  Exporter  1.619*** 1.676*** 1.879*** 1.864*** 1.843*** 1.893*** 1.833*** 1.845*** 1.884***  1.815 
  (0.061) (0.058) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) (0.037) (0.039) (0.043) (0.040)   
Population  Importer  0.897*** 0.930*** 0.999*** 1.015*** 1.017*** 1.067*** 1.091*** 1.016*** 0.993***  1.003 
  (0.072) (0.066) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.028) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029)   
Distance
a  -1.789*** -1.485*** -2.079*** -2.306*** -2.339*** -2.483*** -2.052*** -1.966*** -2.165*** -2.074 
  (0.173) (0.180) (0.109) (0.107) (0.113) (0.101) (0.119) (0.116) (0.107)   
Remoteness Exporter
b  -0.060 -0.670 -0.211 0.187  0.285  0.343 -0.425  -0.946**  -0.433 -0.214 
  (0.577) (0.567) (0.413) (0.475) (0.445) (0.413) (0.375) (0.411) (0.360)   
Remoteness Importer
b  1.753*** 1.096*** 2.066*** 2.009*** 2.132*** 2.099*** 2.313*** 2.587*** 2.838***  2.099 
  (0.329) (0.330) (0.257) (0.255) (0.257) (0.258) (0.244) (0.240) (0.237)   
Common border 
c  0.671* 1.230***  0.280  -0.182  -0.544*  -1.290***  -0.444  -0.282 -0.607* -0.130 
  (0.355) (0.369) (0.349) (0.307) (0.294) (0.411) (0.279) (0.268) (0.346)   
Common language 
d  1.798*** 2.018*** 0.792*** 0.738*** 0.560*** 0.629*** 0.721*** 0.843*** 0.575***  0.964 
  (0.267) (0.291) (0.182) (0.182) (0.183) (0.172) (0.182) (0.184) (0.174)   
Colonial linkage: UK
e  --  --  3.365*** 2.990*** 3.273*** 2.854***  1.841*  2.062**  2.240***  2.661 
  --  --  (0.700) (0.648) (0.751) (0.690) (1.097) (0.808) (0.711)   
Colonial linkage: Spain
f  -0.847** -1.029*** 0.809**  0.803**  1.006*** 1.190*** 1.030***  0.718**  0.923***  0.511 
  (0.352) (0.357) (0.317) (0.321) (0.329) (0.335) (0.304) (0.286) (0.261)   
Colonial linkage: Portugal
g  -1.979***  -1.984*** -0.810 -1.010 -0.945 -0.869 -0.733 -0.614 -0.567 -1.057 
  (0.335) (0.547) (0.590) (0.754) (0.894) (0.752) (0.655) (0.753) (0.939)   
              25
Nafta
h  --  --  -2.434*** -1.825** -1.490** -2.054** -2.159*** -2.010**  -1.972**  -1.992 
  --  --  (0.709) (0.819) (0.739) (0.880) (0.819) (0.825) (0.798)   
Caricom
h  --  --  5.226*** 4.791*** 4.467*** 4.717*** 3.430*** 4.159*** 4.141***  4.419 
  --  --  (0.448) (0.408) (0.453) (0.375) (0.531) (0.498) (0.473)   
Mercosur
h  -0.663 -0.323 -0.968 -1.047 -0.786 -0.451 -0.285 -0.072 -0.273 -0.541 
  (0.722) (0.687) (0.674) (0.677) (0.681) (0.724) (0.625) (0.628) (0.666)   
Andean Pact
h  0.630*  0.653**  0.783**  0.640*  0.943*** 1.092*** 1.285*** 1.226*** 1.339***  0.954 
  (0.318) (0.329) (0.334) (0.368) (0.323) (0.345) (0.306) (0.314) (0.311)   
Cacm
h  2.588*** 2.745*** 2.413*** 2.091*** 2.190*** 2.263*** 2.755*** 2.364*** 2.231***  2.404 
  (0.359) (0.376) (0.337) (0.315) (0.318) (0.342) (0.322) (0.309) (0.303)   
EU Importer
k  0.773*  0.836**  -0.098 0.415 0.315 0.084  -0.508*  -0.344 0.109 0.176 
  (0.466) (0.401) (0.308) (0.327) (0.324) (0.298) (0.267) (0.281) (0.260)   
             
R-squared  0.573 0.589 0.665 0.652 0.652 0.661 0.630 0.650 0.673   
F-statistic  137.767 147.254 259.568 248.303 230.573 286.088 242.451 236.601 284.616   
N  1554 1560 2374 2408 2236 2657 2582 2315 2507   
White’s robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*) Statistically significant at the 10 % level 
**) Statistically significant at the 5 % level 
***) Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
a ) Bilateral distance in kilometers between the capitals of trading partners.  












c) Equal to 1 if the two trading partners are contingent, i.e. they share a common border, 0 otherwise.  
d) Equal to 1 if the two trading partners share a common commercial language, 0 otherwise.  
e) Equal to 1 if one of the trading partners is the UK and the other a former British colony in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise.  (Note that the United States 
is not considered a former colony). 
f) Equal to 1 if one of the trading partners is Spain and the other a former Spanish colony in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise.  
g) Equal to 1 if one of the trading partners is Portugal and other a former Portuguese colony in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise.  
h) Integration/regional dummies: Equal to 1 if both trading partners are members a specific trading agreement, (Nafta, Caricom, Mercosur, Andean Pact, or Cacm 
respectively), 0 otherwise.  
k) Equal to 1 if the importing country is a member of the European Union, 0 otherwise.    26
Table 4: ‘All Food Products’ Trade (UNCTAD 1) 
Dependent Variable: ln(exports of food products from country i to country j in U.S. dollars in a given year) 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Period 
Average 
            
Constant -22.855***  -26.756*** -28.071*** -29.308*** -32.283*** -42.684*** -30.785*** -27.172*** -29.336*** -29.917 
  (4.139) (4.159) (3.611) (3.745) (3.694) (4.315) (3.864) (3.984) (3.490)   
GDP  per  capita  Exporter  1.115*** 1.069*** 1.073*** 1.071*** 1.047*** 1.294*** 1.061*** 1.061*** 0.980***  1.086 
  (0.059) (0.061) (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.071) (0.059) (0.060) (0.052)   
GDP  per  capita  Importer  1.037*** 1.034*** 1.005*** 0.996*** 0.923*** 1.068*** 0.980*** 0.960*** 0.950***  0.995 
  (0.068) (0.065) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.070) (0.065) (0.058) (0.054)   
Population  Exporter  0.704*** 0.725*** 0.915*** 0.918*** 0.941*** 1.094*** 0.993*** 0.963*** 0.912***  0.907 
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.035) (0.032) (0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032)   
Population  Importer  0.806*** 0.799*** 0.846*** 0.876*** 0.886*** 1.004*** 0.957*** 0.837*** 0.883***  0.877 
  (0.047) (0.044) (0.024) (0.026) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.025) (0.028)   
Distance -1.120***  -1.278*** -1.261*** -1.165*** -1.448*** -1.468*** -1.439*** -1.180*** -1.310*** -1.296 
  (0.143) (0.151) (0.081) (0.087) (0.099) (0.109) (0.090) (0.092) (0.085)   
Remoteness  Exporter  -1.145*** -0.621* -0.742*** -0.949*** -0.628** -0.630*  -0.854*** -1.618*** -0.825*** -0.890 
  (0.321) (0.331) (0.277) (0.279) (0.286) (0.327) (0.283) (0.319) (0.256)   
Remoteness  Importer  1.588*** 1.671*** 1.492*** 1.678*** 2.025*** 2.280*** 1.746*** 2.132*** 1.823***  1.826 
  (0.277) (0.285) (0.238) (0.238) (0.237) (0.282) (0.261) (0.253) (0.230)   
Common  border    0.799***  0.604**  0.185 0.224 -0.197 0.243 -0.101 0.346 0.187 0.255 
  (0.285) (0.284) (0.257) (0.227) (0.274) (0.256) (0.253) (0.230) (0.229)   
Common  language  0.320  -0.056  0.585*** 0.711***  0.159  0.668*** 0.696*** 0.934*** 0.692***  0.523 
  (0.253) (0.271) (0.150) (0.158) (0.176) (0.190) (0.169) (0.155) (0.149)   
Colonial  linkage:  UK  --  --  2.945*** 2.733*** 3.155*** 2.898*** 2.398*** 1.693*** 2.148***  2.567 
  --  --  (0.292) (0.274) (0.381) (0.377) (0.379) (0.369) (0.361)   
Colonial  linkage:  Spain  0.606*  0.939*** 0.687*** 0.742*** 1.022*** 0.914*** 0.828***  0.556**  0.720***  0.779 
  (0.323) (0.335) (0.258) (0.252) (0.253) (0.290) (0.285) (0.260) (0.235)   
Colonial  linkage:  Portugal  1.057**  1.677***  0.989***  0.861*  1.168 0.621 0.704 0.659  1.137**  0.986 
  (0.244) (0.337) (0.327) (0.457) (0.732) (0.773) (0.502) (0.874) (0.482)   
              27
Nafta  --  --  0.629 0.874  1.031*  -0.369 0.221 0.304 0.348 0.434 
  --  --  (0.585) (0.625) (0.529) (0.639) (0.592) (0.621) (0.545)   
Caricom  --  --  3.365*** 3.062*** 2.612*** 3.822*** 3.341*** 3.078*** 3.049***  3.190 
  --  --  (0.291) (0.326) (0.366) (0.430) (0.345) (0.355) (0.337)   
Mercosur  0.881**  0.586  0.965* 1.231**  1.050** 0.972*  1.422***  1.570***  1.286**  1.107 
  (0.372) (0.428) (0.487) (0.486) (0.505) (0.525) (0.520) (0.510) (0.523)   
Andean  Pact  0.435  1.005**  0.945*** 1.259***  0.900*  1.208*** 1.441*** 1.622*** 1.475***  1.143 
  (0.494) (0.472) (0.366) (0.321) (0.540) (0.338) (0.323) (0.308) (0.270)   
Cacm  2.752*** 2.700*** 2.593*** 2.877*** 2.590*** 3.131*** 2.689*** 2.843*** 2.620***  2.755 
  (0.348) (0.323) (0.273) (0.251) (0.276) (0.327) (0.273) (0.281) (0.261)   
EU  Importer  0.126  0.568**  0.248  0.293  0.368*  0.641*** 0.440*** 0.511***  0.431**  0.403 
  (0.259) (0.240) (0.202) (0.209) (0.210) (0.238) (0.205) (0.180) (0.185)   
            
R-squared  0.474 0.482 0.587 0.593 0.559 0.523 0.534 0.540 0.580   
F-statistic  69.390  72.659  136.019 142.529 118.099 121.478 126.424 119.988 152.026   
N  1173 1189 1740 1778 1694 2014 2004 1858 2002   
White’s robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*) Statistically significant at the 10 % level 
**) Statistically significant at the 5 % level 
***) Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
a ) Bilateral distance in kilometers between the capitals of trading partners.  












c) Equal to 1 if the two trading partners are contingent, i.e. they share a common border, 0 otherwise.  
d) Equal to 1 if the two trading partners share a common commercial language, 0 otherwise.  
e) Equal to 1 if one of the trading partners is the UK and the other a former British colony in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise.  (Note that the United States 
is not considered a former colony) 
f) Equal to 1 if one of the trading partners is Spain and the other a former Spanish colony in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise.  
g) Equal to 1 if one of the trading partners is Portugal and other a former Portuguese colony in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise.  
h) Integration/regional dummies: Equal to 1 if both trading partners are members a specific trading agreement, (Nafta, Caricom, Mercosur, Andean Pact, or Cacm 
respectively), 0 otherwise.  
k) Equal to 1 if the importing country is a member of the European Union, 0 otherwise.   28
Table 5: Manufactured Good Trade (UNCTAD 5) 
Dependent Variable: ln(exports of manufactured goods from country i to country j in U.S. dollars in a given year) 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Period 
Average 
            
Constant -37.899***  -36.521*** -35.237*** -38.145*** -38.700*** -44.064*** -39.064*** -39.071*** -36.123*** -38.314 
  (3.484) (3.538) (3.033) (3.058) (3.056) (3.461) (3.143) (3.443) (2.739)   
GDP  per  capita  Exporter  1.717*** 1.778*** 1.600*** 1.625*** 1.652*** 1.772*** 1.725*** 1.766*** 1.634***  1.697 
  (0.049) (0.048) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.040)   
GDP  per  capita  Importer  0.882*** 0.867*** 0.865*** 0.858*** 0.849*** 0.988*** 0.939*** 0.889*** 0.889***  0.892 
  (0.054) (0.055) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.046)   
Population  Exporter  1.208*** 1.247*** 1.299*** 1.299*** 1.326*** 1.460*** 1.443*** 1.452*** 1.368***  1.345 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.024)   
Population  Importer  0.751*** 0.740*** 0.944*** 0.976*** 0.945*** 0.989*** 0.946*** 0.925*** 0.894***  0.901 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022)   
Distance -1.309***  -1.338*** -1.628*** -1.668*** -1.675*** -1.869*** -1.685*** -1.583*** -1.562*** -1.591 
  (0.103) (0.101) (0.073) (0.076) (0.073) (0.087) (0.085) (0.087) (0.072)   
Remoteness  Exporter  0.668**  0.918*** 0.807*** 0.997*** 0.999*** 0.881***  0.086  -0.305  -0.088  0.551 
  (0.296) (0.303) (0.258) (0.260) (0.261) (0.294) (0.271) (0.296) (0.227)   
Remoteness  Importer  0.491**  0.012  -0.038  0.059  0.107  0.431**  0.707*** 1.029*** 0.815***  0.401 
  (0.228) (0.223) (0.192) (0.179) (0.175) (0.198) (0.187) (0.196) (0.182)   
Common  border    0.552**  0.835***  0.200 -0.097 -0.231 -0.497 -0.363 -0.046 0.118  0.052 
  (0.236) (0.224) (0.200) (0.217) (0.205) (0.316) (0.316) (0.212) (0.186)   
Common  language  1.053*** 1.075*** 0.613*** 0.723*** 0.695*** 0.798*** 0.757*** 0.822*** 0.660***  0.800 
  (0.182) (0.174) (0.123) (0.117) (0.120) (0.131) (0.130) (0.128) (0.117)   
Colonial linkage: UK  --  --  1.228***  1.240***  0.958***  0.914**  1.049***  0.965**  0.998***  1.050 
  --  --  (0.321) (0.284) (0.334) (0.365) (0.329) (0.418) (0.367)   
Colonial linkage: Spain  -0.004  -0.029  0.652***  0.608**  0.564**  0.819***  0.523***  0.456**  0.643***  0.470 
  (0.249) (0.217) (0.180) (0.240) (0.269) (0.296) (0.197) (0.201) (0.192)   
Colonial  linkage:  Portugal  -0.196  -0.063 0.227 -0.077  -0.187 0.082 0.124 0.292 0.489 0.077 
  (0.896) (0.767) (0.803) (0.654) (0.384) (0.388) (0.172) (0.288) (0.349)   
              29
Nafta  --  --  -0.263 0.146  0.420 -0.321 -0.193 -0.322 -0.191 -0.104 
  --  --  (0.542) (0.724) (0.710) (0.785) (0.717) (0.716) (0.664)   
Caricom  --  --  3.483*** 2.970*** 2.925*** 3.059*** 3.031*** 2.884*** 2.705***  3.008 
  --  --  (0.296) (0.325) (0.323) (0.337) (0.325) (0.335) (0.332)   
Mercosur  0.330 0.098 0.090 0.073 0.301 0.162 0.409 0.389 0.387 0.249 
  (0.459) (0.439) (0.399) (0.394) (0.417) (0.495) (0.445) (0.456) (0.406)   
Andean  Pact  0.660*** 0.767***  0.693**  0.482*  0.943*** 0.915*** 1.028*** 1.106*** 1.164***  0.862 
  (0.206) (0.192) (0.273) (0.293) (0.213) (0.241) (0.235) (0.227) (0.224)   
Cacm  2.715*** 2.405*** 2.327*** 2.270*** 2.377*** 2.488*** 2.595*** 2.497*** 2.278***  2.439 
  (0.256) (0.260) (0.237) (0.222) (0.225) (0.257) (0.255) (0.247) (0.219)   
EU Importer  -0.238  -0.196  -0.508*** -0.544*** -0.240 -0.753***  -0.885*** -1.020*** -1.059*** -0.605 
  (0.230) (0.219) (0.187) (0.178) (0.185) (0.206) (0.173) (0.181) (0.161)   
            
R-squared  0.703 0.718 0.739 0.754 0.745 0.700 0.714 0.726 0.751   
F-statistic  210.910 229.334 316.234 345.714 316.047 296.491 310.168 296.182 366.507   
N  1350 1364 2025 2051 1963 2308 2250 2033 2204   
White’s robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*) Statistically significant at the 10 % level 
**) Statistically significant at the 5 % level 
***) Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
a ) Bilateral distance in kilometers between the capitals of trading partners.  












c) Equal to 1 if the two trading partners are contingent, i.e. they share a common border, 0 otherwise.  
d) Equal to 1 if the two trading partners share a common commercial language, 0 otherwise.  
e) Equal to 1 if one of the trading partners is the UK and the other a former British colony in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise.  (Note that the United States 
is not considered a former colony) 
f) Equal to 1 if one of the trading partners is Spain and the other a former Spanish colony in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise.  
g) Equal to 1 if one of the trading partners is Portugal and other a former Portuguese colony in the Western Hemisphere, 0 otherwise.  
h) Integration/regional dummies: Equal to 1 if both trading partners are members a specific trading agreement, (Nafta, Caricom, Mercosur, Andean Pact, or Cacm 
respectively), 0 otherwise.  
k) Equal to 1 if the importing country is a member of the European Union, 0 otherwise. 